This paper builds a simple theoretical model designed to study dollarization. All policy decisions are made by a benevolent rational government. Each period, the government decides whether or not to dollarize, how much to borrow or lend on an international bond market, and, if dollarization has not occurred, the domestic inflation rate. In equilibrium, international borrowing is limited endogenously such that the government always chooses to repay when the penalty for default is future exclusion from financial markets.
Introduction
The recurrence of currency and financial crises in emerging markets has generated an intense debate on the appropriate exchange rate regime. Dollarization 1 has attracted special attention, in part because of the recent official dollarization of Ecuador and El Salvador. The proponents of dollarization argue that dollarizing offers a range of potential benefits. One is the greater integration in goods and asset markets that may follow from reducing exchange rate uncertainty and transaction costs (see, for example, Calvo 1999, Berg and Borensztein 2000, Mendoza 2000) . A second is the elimination of the possibility of currency crises. In particular, dollarization solves the 'fear of floating' problem (Calvo 2000) which arises when international liabilities are denominated in dollars and currency devaluations can therefore precipitate debt crises. Third, there is empirical evidence that dollarization brings lower and less volatile inflation to countries adopting a stronger currency (Edwards 2001) .
Among the costs of dollarization that are often cited are the loss of seigniorage revenues and the inability to respond to external shocks with monetary policy (see Canzoneri and Rogers 1990 , Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2001 , Cooley and Quadrini 2001 . Traditionally this loss of flexibility has focussed on the ability to adjust the short-run real interest rate or the real exchange rate in response to country-specific shocks. At the same time, the ability to print money can also be a valuable fiscal instrument for emerging-markets economies.
Perhaps the most important difference between dollarizing and simply pegging the exchange rate is that it is much less easy to change exchange rate regimes when dollarized. Since we want to focus specifically on the issue of dollarization, we therefore begin by considering the potential gains that accrue when a dollarizing nation permanently ties its hands with regards to monetary policy. One view is that adopting countries face more severe time consistency problems in setting monetary policy than countries whose currencies are being adopted. However, it is not immediate that higher inflation rates necessarily indicate a lack of credibility in this sense. An alternative interpretation is that high and volatile inflation in some emerging-markets economies may simply reflect the existence of periods during which less distorting sources of revenue are not available.
In this paper we explore an alternative avenue via which dollarization may increase credibility. In particular, we explore a mechanism which can potentially rationalize the view that dollarization should increase international financial integration, in this case by changing default incentives rather than by reducing uncertainty or transaction costs.
The basic idea is as follows. Emerging market economies are typically subject to big shocks, large fractions of government revenue are linked to volatile commodity prices, and raising tax rates often increases evasion and substitution towards the informal sector. Thus traditional sources of government revenue are often volatile and difficult to adjust. In this context seigniorage is a valuable fiscal instrument, since extra money can rapidly be printed as required. At the same time, emerging-markets economies also issue debt to smooth fluctuations and to ease temporary liquidity problems.
The key element of our story is that dollarization can help strengthen fragile sovereign debt markets by increasing borrowers' incentives to repay loans. The reason is that debt and seigniorage are partial substitutes as revenue sources, so that a economy with an independent monetary policy is prone to default, even if this means future exclusion from credit markets. The benefit of dollarization is that credit constraints are loosened as the ability to access international debt markets becomes more valuable, and the likelihood of default is therefore reduced.
We develop a simple small open economy model to study the interaction between the exchange rate regime and international financial integration. In this framework international debt contracts are not directly enforceable. Households enjoy consuming both private and public goods. A benevolent and rational government decides on the optimal exchange rate regime in the presence of shocks to productivity and to the relative taste for private and public consumption. If a flexible exchange rate regime is chosen, the government decides on foreign asset holdings, and the domestic devaluation rate. The dollarization decision is irreversible, and once dollarized the government's only policy instrument is its international debt position. For simplicity, the government does all the international borrowing and lending in the economy. Foreign creditors set borrowing limits contingent on the exchange rate regime chosen, such that the government always has the incentive to honor its obligations, where the penalty in case of default is permanent financial autarky.
As a first step, we compare a permanently flexible exchange rate regime with a dollarized regime. The parameters defining the shock processes are calibrated so that the flexible exchange rate economy replicates some key features of the Mexican economy. We calibrate to Mexico, since Mexico has frequently been discussed as a candidate for dollarization. We find that large taste shocks are required to account for the fact that government expenditure (and government consumption) is much more volatile that GDP. In addition, the model does a good job in terms of replicating some key empirical correlations, such as the acycicality of government spending, and the negative correlation between government spending and private consumption.
Comparing the permanently flexible regime to the dollarized economy, the dollarized economy exhibits less volatile private consumption and less volatile government spending. In terms of the dynamics of international borrowing, the current account and the net foreign asset position are much more volatile under the dollarized regime, indicating more active use of international borrowing as a policy instrument, and the borrowing constraint is looser, as expected. The looser borrowing constraint translates into less frequent debt crises, identified as periods in which the borrowing constraint is binding.
In order to address welfare issues, we then move to consider the version of the model in which the economy starts out under a floating regime, and each period decides whether or not to dollarize. We find that dollarization is the optimal exchange rate regime when taste shocks are relatively large to productivity shocks, and when the government's international debt becomes sufficiently large. If the government is an international net creditor, on the other hand, the benefits from flexible exchange rates exceed the benefits from greater access to international credit markets, and thus it is optimal to remain floating.
Recent experiments with dollarization In 2000, Ecuador dollarized its economy in the midst of a severe economic crises with a collapsing banking system, a sliding local currency, and after defaulting on its Brady bonds late in 1999. The regime was implemented in an attempt to reduce inflation, bring stability to the economy, and gain credibility with international investors. Since dollarization, Ecuador's inflation has been significantly reduced to single digits and the country has been able to renegotiate its debts at somewhat lower interest rates.
El Salvador implemented its dollarization plan in 2001 more in an effort to attract foreign investors than to stabilize inflation; the colon had been pegged to the dollar since 1994. In January 2001, the currency began to be phased out and today the dollar is the only unit of account. The most notable benefit that Salvadoreans have enjoyed with dollarization are lower interest rates. In fact the day after El Salvador adopted the new currency, the interest rate on consumer loans and mortgages fell from 17 to 11 percent. Consumer credit is growing, and companies and the government have been helped by cheaper international financing.
Panama is the nation that has been dollarized the longest, since 1904. Goldfajn and Olivares (2000) document that Panama has had lower inflation rates than other countries in Latin America. Panama is also strongly integrated in international financial markets, with many foreign banks operating in the country. They report that foreign banks charge lower interest rates on loans than domestic banks.
Other dollarized economies include East Timor, Guatemala, Kosovo and other small countries, and nations such as Bulgaria, Costa Rica and Honduras are also considering this option.
Related literature Our paper is related to several studies that have studied the benefits and costs of dollarization. Some papers have argued that dollarization may not be beneficial because the optimal inflation rate may be country specific. For example, Cooley and Quadrini (2000) find that dollarization is not welfare-improving for Mexico because the US inflation is not long-run optimal for Mexico. Their findings are derived from the assumption that foreign and domestic inputs are complementary in production, and a larger nominal interest rates creates a positive terms of trade shocks. Canzoneri and Rogers (1990) make a similar point, though they focus on the European union and their finding that the optimal inflation rate is country-specific depends on differences in the efficiency of tax collection systems across countries.
Other papers have argued that dollarization is the best exchange rate regime for emerging markets because managed exchange rate regimes are not credible, impose large distortions, and are prone to currency crises. Mendoza (2000) finds substantial welfare gains from dollarization by eliminating price and wealth distortions induced by a lack of credibility in stabilization policies that are enlarged by financial constraints. Calvo (2000) argues that dollarization prevents countries from experiencing costly balance of payment crises, enhances credibility of policy makers, and eliminates currency mismatches when liabilities are dollarized.
Another group of papers have argued that dollarization imposes relatively larger costs, making flexible exchange rates the optimal regime. Sims (2002) finds that dollarization prevents the economy from issuing state contingent nominal debt, while not changing dollar interest rates. In this sense, dollarization limits the set of assets available to the government. However, its has been largely documented that governments in emerging markets are unable to issue external debt in their own currency, and their liabilities are largely dollarized, no matter what exchange rate regimes they have.
Model
We study a very simple small open economy. Output is produced from labor according to a linear technology. Consumption is composed of a mix of privately and publicly-provided goods. A benevolent government seeks to maximize the utility of a representative consumer. The government trades one period bonds in international financial markets at a constant interest rate. However, the government cannot commit to repay international debts; contracts must be self-enforcing. In addition to debt, the inflation rate may be used as an additional policy instrument as long as the value of the currency is allowed to float.
Households
Households are infinitely-lived and have preferences over privately and publicly provided consumption goods and leisure
Period utility takes the following separable form:
where λ, which captures the relative taste for publicly versus privately provided consumption, evolves according to a Markov process. In the context of this simple model, we view λ as capturing changes through time in household preferences either for two different types of good (public versus private goods) or changes in the taste for the allocation mechanism (government provision versus market provision). One possible manifestation of these changes taste would be electoral cycles in which populist free-spending governments and more fiscally conservative market-oriented governments take turns in power.
2
In order to simplify the exposition, we shall abstract entirely from nominal variables in the description of the model. Monetary policy will be entirely summarized by the effective tax rate that inflation imposes on consumption. Note that in this one good model with PPP holding, the domestic inflation rate equals the devaluation rate. In the background we have in mind a cash-in-advance economy, in which the government prints new money in the interval of time between when households receive their labor income and when they spend it on consumption goods. The monetary model is described in the appendix.
In the real description of the model, inflation operates as a time-varying tax on consumption. In addition to the consumption tax, households face a constant tax on labor. They make consumption and labor decisions taking as given taxes and the wage rate, subject to the following period-by-period budget constraint
where τ c t is the consumption tax rate, and τ n is the constant labor tax rate. Combining households first order conditions and their budget constraint gives the following solution for the optimal labor supply choice:
Note that this is not the efficient choice for hours, which is independent of λ t . 3 We get this expression for hours irrespective of the tax rates on labor and consumption, as long as taxes can only be proportional.
2 An alternative interpretation of the model is that the household period utility function is time-invariant, and that changes through time in the value for λ really reflect changes in the preferences of the government. This alternative interpretation, as will become clear, has no impact on allocations in the model, though it is, of course, important for welfare issues and the characterization of the optimal exchange rate regime.
3 Households reduce hours in periods when government consumption is relatively highly valued, since they equate the marginal value of leisure to the marginal value of an additional hour spent producing market consumption. In the efficient allocation, hours are constant through time and equal to α.
Firms
Firms produce output according to a linear technology where labor is the only input to production. Output can be freely divided between the privately and the publicly-provided consumption goods. The production technology is subject productivity shocks, which follow a Markov process:
where A t is the value for productivity in period t.
The real wage rate in equilibrium is given by the marginal productivity of labor:
Government
The government is the only actor in the model with access to an international bond market. 4 In the bond market the government can borrow and lend one period bonds at a constant real interest rate r. International financial markets are far from complete, since no assets are traded whose returns are contingent on the shocks that will hit the economy in the next period. However, the assumed market structure seems appropriate for emerging-markets economies, for whom international borrowing must typically be repaid at non-contingent dates in non-contingent numbers of U.S. dollars. In additional to being the single internationally traded asset, debt contracts are also not externally enforceable. We assume that lenders can commit to honor their debt contracts, but the domestic government cannot commit not to default on its debt obligations if it is an international net debtor. If it defaults, creditors are assumed to credibly punish the government by permanently excluding it from the bond market; a defaulting government can neither buy nor sell bonds. Given that bonds are traded at a constant world interest rate, the only way that lenders can assure repayment is by rationing credit.
5 Thus lenders impose endogenous borrowing constraints on the government such that no borrowing occurs beyond the point at which the probability of default in the subsequent period is positive. Default incentives, however, depend on the exchange rate regime the government chooses. Thus the maximum amount of borrowing allowed at a point in time is dependent on both current exchange rate policy, and the current state of the economy. The government finances its expenditures with the consumption (inflation) tax, by taxing labor at a constant rate, and by borrowing from abroad. Each period it decides on the exchange rate regime and whether to default. Dollarization is assumed to be irreversible, once dollarization is chosen, the exchange rate regime is taken as given in subsequent periods.
If the dollarization decision has never been taken in the past, the precise timing of decisions is as follows. First, the government observes current period productivity A t and the current taste shock λ t and decides whether to dollarize. The dollarization decision and the current period shocks determine the borrowing limit. Given the borrowing limit, the government then decides whether or not to default on its outstanding debt (though this never occurs in equilibrium). Finally, given the dollarization and default decisions, the government chooses values for the available policy instruments. If the government elected to dollarize and default, it gets to set only a permanent labor tax. In this case, dollarization implies inflation equal to the U.S. rate, while default excludes the use of debt as an instrument. If the government elected to dollarize but not to default, it sets the permanent labor tax and chooses net debt purchases. If the government elected to remain floating and to default, it sets the current period inflation (consumption tax) rate. Lastly, if the government elected to remain floating and not to default, it both sets the current period consumption tax and also chooses net debt purchases.
The reason for allowing a dollarizing government to permanently adjust the labor tax rate is that changes in exchange rate regime are often accompanied by fiscal reform. In addition, when inflation stabilizes, real revenues from traditional tax sources typically rise as inflation ceases to erode the real value of revenue that occurs when taxes are collected with a lag. Outside periods when the exchange rate regime changes, we assume that the labor tax rate is constant. This is designed to capture the idea, discussed in the introduction, that income taxes are difficult to adjust, at least over relatively short periods of time.
The timing for an economy that has dollarized is simpler. In this case, the government first decides whether to default (after observing the current period shocks). Then if it defaults, it has no further choices to make; in this case all revenue will come from the previously chosen labor tax rate. If it does not default, the dollarized government chooses net debt purchases.
Government's problem when dollarized
We formulate the government's problem recursively. If the government elects to dollarize it must set τ c = τ c , (where τ c is the U.S. inflation rate) in each future date. In the simulations we will assume τ c = 0. In the first period it elects to dollarize, it chooses a permanent labor tax τ n . In every period it chooses net debt purchases, B 0 .
The government's problem is
and
Equation 6 is the government's budget constraint. Equation 7 is the borrowing constraint for the dollarized government. Equations 8 and 9 are the household's budget constraint, and the expression defining the optimal hours choice for the household.
From eq. 8, the choice for τ n effectively determines the average level of future private consumption. Debt policy impacts the time path for government consumption (see 6).
The inter-temporal first order condition for debt is given by:
where u g = α(1 − λ) g is the marginal utility of government consumption, and ψ is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint (eq. 7).
Equation 10 indicates that under the dollarized regime, debt is used to smooth the marginal utility of public consumption through time. When public consumption is highly valued (low λ), the government would like to spend more. At the same time, hours worked and tax revenues will be relatively low. Thus debt will be issued these periods.
The endogenous borrowing constraint is such that the government always has incentives for debt repayment. Let V aut d (λ, A) denote the value of autarky when dollarized. Then to ensure that contracts are self-enforcing it must be the case that
Given that we are assuming that only one period debt bonds are available at a constant world interest rate r, the borrowing constraint B d (λ, A) is just tight enough to guarantee no default for all possible next period states given today's state. The value of default is strictly increasing in the amount of debt one owes, while the value of autarky is independent of the level of debt (default wipes out all existing debts). Thus the more debt a country has, the more attractive is default. For any combination of shocks in the next period, there is therefore a value for debt such that at that level of debt the government will be indifferent between defaulting and not defaulting, for greater levels of debt default will be strictly preferred, and for smaller levels repayment will be strictly optimal. Let B d (λ, A) be the solution to
The current period borrowing limit will then be the smallest B d (λ 0 , A 0 ) across all (λ 0 , A 0 ) combinations that have positive probability:
4 Government's problem when floating
When the economy is floating, the government can choose to remain floating or to dollarize. The government will choose the regime that gives the highest expected lifetime utility:
where V d (B, λ, A) is the value of dollarizing and is given by 5 and V o (B, λ, A) is the value of deciding to float for at least one more period. When the government chooses to continue floating, it decides on consumption taxes and bond holdings to solve the following problem:
subject to the following constraints:
Equation 14 is the government budget constraint under floating exchange rates. Sources of revenue are a period-by-period consumption tax, and foreign borrowing. Equation 15 is the borrowing constraint under flexible exchange rates, and it guarantees debt repayment for all shocks and exchange rate regimes in the following period. Equations 16 and 17 reflect aspects of equilibrium household behavior that the government internalizes when choosing consumption taxes and bond holdings. Note that consumption taxes in this model are time consistent because the household's problem is static.
The endogenous borrowing constraint under floating exchange rates is constructed in a similar way to that in the dollarized economy. Let
denotes the value of autarky when floating given the state (λ, A). The current period borrowing limit will then be the smallest B f (λ 0 , A 0 ) across all (λ 0 , A 0 ) combinations that have positive probability:
The first order condition for the current period consumption tax, τ c , simplifies to:
Thus, if it decides to remain floating, the government uses the consumption tax to obtain an efficient division of output between private and public consumption. Note that this efficient division does not rely on the government being able to use debt.
The inter-temporal first order condition for debt is as in the dollarized economy (see 10). However, since the consumption tax is used to equate the marginal utilities of public and private consumption period by period, smoothing the marginal utility of government consumption though time now also effectively means smoothing the marginal utility of private consumption. In fact, using 14, 16, 17, 20 and 10 the marginal utility of government consumption under floating exchange rates simplifies to
while the optimal consumption tax rate is given by
.
Equation 21 indicates that a floating, credit-worthy government essentially uses debt to smooth output fluctuations. Debt will typically be issued when output is relatively low, which can happen either because of low productivity (low A) or because of low taste for private consumption (low λ).
Equation 22 indicates that if debt is doing its job and smoothing output, then τ c will typically be higher when the taste for government consumption is high (low λ). Thus inflation and government consumption will tend to commove. Note that for a given level of assets, the more borrowing is done, the larger is the consumption tax. Conversely, if it is difficult to borrow too much (because the borrowing constraint binds) the consumption tax will be higher. In this sense, debt and inflation taxes are partial substitutes in financing government expenditures. Equation 22 also indicates, that abstracting from shocks to λ, then if debt is smoothing output τ c will be higher the higher is the current level of productivity A.
In both the dollarized and flexible economies, labor supply and output are given by the same expressions. In both economies, the government is seeking to smooth the marginal utility of government consumption through time. When dollarized, tax revenue is simply a fixed fraction of output. When floating, revenue is a changing fraction of output, which varies with the tax rate τ c . Since τ c rises when the taste for government consumption is high (see the discussion above) tax revenue tends to rise exactly in those periods when revenue is most needed. Thus if taste shocks are important, we might expect debt policy to be less activist in the floating economy. Conversely, if productivity shocks are more important, debt should be used more aggressively in the floating regime. The reason is that when productivity is high in the floating regime, the consumption tax rate rises, so there is a surge in revenue that must be offset by increased saving abroad.
The government's problem in autarky
If the government defaults it is permanently excluded from credit markets and lives in autarky. But even in autarky, a floating government still gets to choose whether to dollarize or to remain floating. Given that under dollarization tax rates are set permanently, while when floating they are set period by period, the value of default when dollarized is always less than the value of default when floating. 6 This implies immediately that simultaneously dollarizing and defaulting is not a good option. Thus, if a floating government defaults, it will choose to remain floating thereafter. In the context of this model, this is a rather obvious point, but it is interesting to note that during the recent crisis in Argentina there were advocates of a default and dollarize strategy. In the model, the only benefit of dollarizing is increased credibility in international financial markets, which is immediately squandered in case of default.
Under autarky, optimal consumption taxes play the same role as in the case where an intertermporal smoothing instrument is available; they divide output efficiently between public and private consumption. Consumption taxes under autarky are given by:
The government raises consumption taxes when value of government consumption is high, and lowers them when the value of private consumption is high. Private and public consumption allocations under autarky are then given by g If the government were to default on its debt obligations when dollarized, period by period public and private consumption would are given by
Decision to dollarize
In the floating exchange rate regime, debt and the inflation tax are used to smooth the marginal utility of government consumption, whereas in the dollarized regime only debt serves this function. Thus debt is more valuable to a dollarized government that to a floating regime because it is the sole instrument for smoothing. For this reason, a dollarized government has greater incentives for debt repayment, and in equilibrium it may therefore be possible to sustain more borrowing (support looser borrowing constraints). The irreversible nature of adopting a foreign currency is the key mechanism through which greater credibility can be attained. If dollarization could be undone, then an indebted country could default and reduce the pain of credit market exclusion by reverting to a flexible exchange rate regime, and using the devaluation rate as a shock-absorber.
Simulations
We solve three economies: the permanently dollarized economy, a permanently flexible exchange rate economy, and a flexible economy that has the option of dollarization. We compare business cycle statistics, and financial integration between the two economies: flexible and dollarized. Then, we characterize the economy that has the option of dollarizing, and analyze the conditions under which dollarization will be chosen as the welfare maximizing exchange rate regime.
Parameter values
Given the limited data we have for dollarized economies, we use the permanently flexible exchange rate regime to calibrate the model to mimic empirical regularities in the Mexican annual data. Annual interest rate r is set to 4%, and labor share α is set to 0.7 which are a standard values in real business cycle models. This small open economy model with borrowing constraints obtains a unique limiting distribution of assets by satisfying the condition that β(1 + r) < 1 We choose the time preference parameter β to match the current account volatility in Mexico. Mean λ of 0.81 is set to match the mean government expenditure to GDP ratio in Mexico of 19%. Shocks to productivity and relative taste for public and private consumption are assumed to be independent of each other and independent over time. The standard deviation of shocks are set jointly to match that of output and government expenditures in Mexico. Table 1 summarizes the parameters values in the model. Consumption and output volatility is similar in Mexico, with consumption volatility being slightly larger. Government expenditure is significantly more volatile, about twice as volatile as output and constitutes a significant share of output,18.8%. Average inflation in Mexico has been high, with an annual average of about 21.3%, and highly volatile. Seigniorage revenue, defined as the difference in the monetary base, has been on average 2.2% of output, and a significant source of revenue for the government, being 11.7% of government spending.
Permanently Floating and Permanently Dollarized
In the data, the correlation between consumption and output is positive, and government spending is acylical. It is interesting to note that government expenditures and consumption are negatively correlated. Inflation rates are negatively correlated with output, and positively correlated with government spending. Table 3 shows business cycle statistics for the benchmark model under flexible exchange rates and dollarization. For the flexible economy we use a labor tax rate of zero, and let the government choose the optimal inflation rate to finance government consumption.
The permanently flexible economy can match some of the features of the Mexican economy. Standard deviations of output, government, and the current account were calibrated jointly by the choice of the standard deviations of shocks and the time preference parameter. The volatility of consumption is close to the output volatility, although slightly lower in the simulated economy. Note that the model can match the simultaneous high volatility of government and low volatility of consumption, even though in the flexible economy the government smooths through time the marginal utility of both, private and public consumption. The intuition why this happens is that in the model, households work more in states where private consumption is more valued. Thus it is easier for the government to smooth the marginal utility of private consumption through time because of the wealth effect labor supply has.
The model can also match the contemporaneous negative correlation between government and private consumption, and the slightly negative correlation between government and output. In the model, the taste shock makes households value highly private consumption, and value less public consumption simultaneously tending to make the correlation negative. But productivity shocks tend to make that correlation positive, because when output is high, the government would optimally want to increase both public and private consumption.
The model also matches the positive correlation between inflation and government, observed in the data. This is because in the flexible economy, the government finances public consumption with the inflation tax revenue and debt.
On the downside, the model does not match the negative correlation between inflation and output observed. The reason is the wealth effect the productivity shocks has and the tight borrowing constraint. When output is high, the government wants to increase government spending, which implies increasing the optimal tax rate if net foreign assets are positive. Given the endogenous tight constraint the economy has, foreign assets are positive on average, making that equilibrium inflation rate to move together with output. If more borrowing could be sustained in equilibrium, then the model could produce the negative correlation.
The model generates a positive correlation between the current account and output, whereas in the data the correlation in negative. Under floating exchange rates, debt is used in the model to smooth output variations coming from taste and productivity shocks. The government runs down its assets in periods of low output, and engages in precautionary savings in periods of relatively high output. Thus, as any insuring type model of debt without investment, current account and output will be positively correlated. Table 3 also presents statistics for the permanently dollarized economy for the benchmark model calibration. We choose a fix labor tax, such that the mean of government consumption is the same as in the flexible economy case. The dollarized economy presents a higher degree of international financial integration than the flexible exchange rate economy. The first thing to note, is that the dollarized economy can sustain more borrowing in equilibrium. The endogenous borrowing constraint in the dollarized economy is more than twice as large as in the flexible economy. The government of the dollarized economy has less incentives to default because debt is more valuable as it is the only policy available for smoothing government fluctuations, and thus its credibility in financial markets is increased. Figure 1 presents the distribution of assets in the limiting distribution for the flexible and dollarized economies. Both economies have a distribution of assets that have a probability mass at the constraint. The dollarized economy features a lower probability of being in a financial crises, i.e. the probability mass at the respective constraint falls from 35% in the flexible economy to 16% in the dollarized case.
Business cycle statistics in the dollarized economy, are qualitatively similar than in the flexible economy, although inflation and seigniorage are zero. Consumption volatility is exactly equal to output volatility, because in the dollarized economy with a constant taxes, there is no way of affecting the time path of private consumption. One thing to note is that debt is a good substitute for seigniorage revenue as the volatility of government consumption is similar in the dollarized regime, when the inflation tax is not available.
In the next set of experiments, we analyze the economy independently facing only productivity shocks or only taste shocks. The sources of the economy's fluctuations are key determinants on the effects dollarization has on financial integration. The nature of the stochastic structure also sheds light in understanding the source of business cycle statistics in Mexico. We find evidence of both type of shocks in Mexico.
When the economy's fluctuations come only from government / taste/ fiscal type shocks, dollarization has the greatest impact on increasing financial integration . Table 4 shows business cycle statistics for the economies that faces only taste shocks. Specifically, we use the same parameters as in the benchmark calibration, but kept productivity constant through time.
An interesting feature of the flexible economy with only taste shocks, is that it delivers the empirically correct negative correlation between inflation and output, and qualitatively the higher standard deviation of inflation relative to output. In this economy, households work less producing lower output, in periods of a high taste for government consumption And at the same time, the government wants to raise revenues, increasing the inflation tax. Figure 3 shows the optimal inflation tax as a function of foreign assets for the two taste shocks. The optimal inflation rate is a decreasing function of the level of foreign assets because the larger the government's savings, the less revenue it needs to raise. Inflation will be the highest, when the economy has low output and is financially constraint, i.e. in crises.
The endogenous borrowing constraint in this experiment increases from about 0 to 2.6% of output when a flexible exchange rate economy is compared with a dollarized economy. The dollarized economy also presents a much more active debt policy, as shown by an increased in the volatility of the current account. Figure 2 shows net saving as a function of current assets for both shocks. The figure shows how net savings is more sensitive to the current shock in the dollarized economy, producing a more volatile debt policy. The intuition why debt policy is more volatile with dollarization when the model faces only taste shocks is as follows. Debt policy is a substitute for inflation in smoothing the marginal utility of public consumption, but the inflation policy will most active when the government needs to change the division of output between public and private consumption more frequently. That is , the inflation tax policy is more active when the economy has relatively larger taste shocks. This can be seen by noting that the ratio of the standard deviation of inflation to output increases from .84 in the benchmark model, to 1.36 in the model with only taste shocks. Thus, a dollarized economy, would be need a more active debt policy, to counteract the loss of the inflation tax instrument.
A third measure of financial integration is the probability that the economy experiences crises. In this model, the probability of crises is reduced by more than in the benchmark model, with a drop in the probability mass at the constraint from 50% to 15%.
In the last experiment, we look at the economy facing only productivity shocks. Table 4 also presents business cycle statistics for the flexible and dollarized economies with only productivity shocks. The flexible economy cannot match the high volatility of government consumption observed in the data. Government volatility is much lower and equal to consumption volatility because with only productivity shocks the government uses debt to equate the volatility of private and public consumption through time. Inflation tax does not need to be too volatile in this case because the efficient division of the time varying output is accomplished with a fairly flat tax. Note that the relative volatility of inflation to output is the lowest in this experiment. Inflation, private consumption, output and government consumption all commove in this experiment. In the data however, government consumption is acylical, and negatively correlated with private consumption. Overall, we find evidence that in Mexico both sources of fluctuations, productivity shocks, and government expenditures are important in order to match the relative volatilities and correlations in the business cycle.
For the economy facing only productivity shocks, dollarization does not increase financial integration. The dollarized economy produces a tighter endogenous borrowing constraint than the flexible economy, and a less volatile current account. Both economies are often financial constraint, with an equal probability of being in crises.
Our main findings in this section are that the effect dollarization has on financial integration depends crucially on which type of shocks economies face. If economies fluctuations are mainly due to productivity disturbances, dollarization does not increase financial integration and will never be the welfare improving exchange rate regime. On the other hand, if economies fluctuations mainly come from shocks affecting government expenditures needs, then dollarization provides a mechanism for the government to gain credibility in financial markets, and thus is increase financial integration.
Is dollarization welfare improving?
[to be completed]
In order to address the welfare implications of dollarization, we now analyze the model, where the government has the option of dollarizing. The government will choose dollarization in this framework only if in fact it is welfare improving. Note that increasing financial integration, does not necessarily mean an increase in welfare in our model, because there is a real cost of abandoning the inflation tax policy.
We solve the economy for the benchmark calibration, and find that dollarization would never be chosen as the optimal exchange rate regime. With this calibration, the economy will always be better off just letting its currency float to adjust for government fluctuations, than to give up the inflation tax and gain greater financial integration.
We then simulate the economy that has the option of dollarizing for the case of only taste shocks. We find that for this economy, dollarization is welfare improving, and in fact will be chosen as the optimal exchange rate regime, when foreign assets fall below some threshold. Figure 4 shows the dynamics of this economy in the process of dollarizing. Dollarization is chosen in the 14th period after we start the simulation. We can see, that inflation is steadily increasing prior to dollarization, falling to zero when dollarization is chosen. Debt is continually increasing in the simulation and, in the period where dollarization is chosen, the economy can borrow a larger amount of debt. Private consumption falls to a very low level before the economy chooses dollarization. In fact in periods 9th through 11th, the economy is at the constraint, and private consumption remains low for these periods. The economy is willing to experience number of periods of crises, before it finds it optimal to give up the inflation tax and dollarize.
Overall, we find that dollarization is the optimal exchange rate regime when taste shocks are relatively large to productivity shocks, and when the government's international debt becomes sufficiently large. If the government is an international net creditor, on the other hand, the benefits from flexible exchange rates exceed the benefits from greater access to international credit markets, and thus it is optimal to remain floating.
Solution Method 8 Appendix: Nominal variables
Money and prices were absent from the model described above. However, the real economy described above, in which the government's policy instrument is effectively a consumption tax, is equivalent to a cash-in-advance monetary model, which we now describe. For expositional simplicity, we abstract here from other taxes.
At the start of each period, there is a stock M t−1 of money in circulation, and all this money is initially held by firms. Individuals decide how much to work, with perfect foresight of how monetary policy will be conducted within the period. When making their labor supply decision they therefore take as given the price P t at which they will be able to purchase consumption at the end of the period. They also know that the (nominal) wage w t is such that aggregate payments to labor (w t N t ) exhaust the cash held by firms.
Thus a typical household's budget constraint is given by
Now in between the times when households work and consume, the government prints D t dollars of new money. So
Assuming inflation is high enough such that it is never optimal for households to carry cash from one period to the next, all money wages will be used to purchase output at the end of the period, and no cash will be carried over into the next period (we can verify ex post that it is never optimal to carry cash forward). Firms carry cash from sales at the end of the current period into the start of the next period.
The quantity equation for the end of the period (given velocity equal to 1) is
In equilibrium all households will work the same number of hours and produce the same amount of consumption, so the household's budget constraint (in equilibrium) simplifies to
Combining these last two equations we get
where
Pt is the real value of seigniorage revenues. Now return to the household's budget constraint, which, substituting in the expression for the wage and dividing through by the price level, is
From the quantity equation, P t = M t /Y t ,so this simplifies to
where µ t is the gross growth rate of the money supply. Thus A t is the real pre-tax wage, and µ t is effectively a gross tax rate on consumption. In aggregate, the budget constraint simplifies to
The government buys output with seigniorage revenue, but it also borrows output from abroad (the bond). The government budget constraint in real terms is
Now combining eqns. 24 and 25 we get
so the government budget constraint reduces to
The seigniorage / inflation tax collected by the govt is
Note that when 1 + τ c t = µ t the government budget constraint and the household budget constraint in this monetary economy are identical to those in the real economy described in the main text. Standard deviations are computed with HP filtered data with a smoothing parameter of 100.
All variables are log, except current account, and seignorage data that are reported as percentage of GDP and inflation that is reported as percentage.
Annual data is taken from IFS 1965 -2001
Mexican Data Means are reported as percentage of GDP, except for inflation data which are annual percentage rates.
Standard deviations and correlations are computed with HP filtered data with a smoothing parameter of 100.
All variables are log, except current account and seigniorage data that are reported as percentage of GDP Means are reported as percentage of GDP, except for inflation data which are annual percentage rates.
Flexible Exchange Rates Dollarization
All variables are log, except current account and seigniorage data that are reported as percentage of GDP
Flexible Exchange Rates
Flexible Exchange Rates 
